Category Archives: Cyber Security

Introducing FreeMyBits.com

FreeMyBits helps you get your data back under your control.

There are many ways your organization can lose control of its precious data. You may have been locked-in by vendor or service provider, you may have outgrown a system or you need to downsize a legacy behemoth, you may have lost a key employee, you may have been hacked or your perhaps obsolescence simply caught up with you.

Whatever the reason is, FreeMyBits helps small and medium business like yours to get control back. Their team consists of specialists with proven enterprise expertise.  FreeMyBits can handle both mainstream systems and obscure legacy contraptions. They succeed where others struggle.

FreeMyBits also provides planning and consulting services to minimize the risk of lock-in.

Script for Verifying Authoritative Name Servers

As organizations tighten their web server security, attackers are looking for new weak links.  One of these weak links are DNS hosting companies and domain registrars.   Even though your own security may be top notch, are you sure that your domain registrar is equally bullet proof?   If the hacker can convince your registrar to change name servers to those under the hacker’s control, the hacker can start doing all kinds of nasty stuff.

Other than shopping around for DNS hosting companies and registrars that have strong security practices including (but not limited to) two-factor authentication, what else can be done?

Monitoring; If you can quickly detect that someone has made an unauthorized change to your name servers or other DNS records, you can minimize the damage by acting quickly and taking control back away from them.

Below is a script that will check your DNS records against a while list of allowed entries:

<?php

//Change this:
//Domain you wish to verify
$domain = "www.somedomain.com";
//Valid DNS hosts for your domain (detect change at registrar)
$authWhitelist= array("ns1.somednshost.com","ns2.somednshost.com");
//Valid A records (detect change at DNS host)
$aRecordWhitelist= array("11.22.33.44","55.66.77.88");

require_once 'Net/DNS2.php';

function lookupAuthorities($domain,$server)
{
 $serverIP = gethostbyname($server);

 $resolver = new Net_DNS2_Resolver( array('nameservers' => array($serverIP)) );

 $resp = $resolver->query($domain, 'A');
 //print_r($resp);

 $servers= array();

 foreach($resp->authority as &$record)
 {
 //keep for later
 $name = $record->name;

 array_push($servers,$record->nsdname);
 }

 $result = (object) [
 'name' => $name,
 'servers' => $servers,
 ];

 return $result;
}

function lookupAuthoritativeNameservers($domain)
{
 $authorities =lookupAuthorities($domain,"a.root-servers.net");

 if($authorities->name != $domain)
 {
 $authorities = lookupAuthorities($domain,$authorities->servers[0]);
 }
 return $authorities->servers;

}

function lookupARecords($domain,$authNameserver)
{
 $serverIP = gethostbyname($authNameserver);

 $resolver = new Net_DNS2_Resolver( array('nameservers' => array($serverIP)) );

 $resp = $resolver->query($domain, 'A');
 //print_r($resp);

 $servers= array();


 foreach($resp->answer as &$record)
 {


 array_push($servers,$record->address);
 }


 return $servers;

}



$authServers = lookupAuthoritativeNameservers($domain);

$authDiff=array_diff($authServers,$authWhitelist);

$aRecords = lookupARecords($domain,$authServers[0]);

$aRecordDiff = array_diff($aRecords,$aRecordWhitelist);


if(count($authDiff)>0 || count($aRecordDiff)>0)
{
 echo ($domain . " Fail (See offending entries below)\n");
 if(count($authDiff)>0) print_r($authDiff);
 if(count($aRecordDiff)>0) print_r($aRecords);

}
else
{
 echo($domain . " Pass\n");
}


?>

Script will return “Pass” if everything is ok.  If any of the results is not specified on the white list script will show “Fail” including a list of all offending entries.

You can either run this as a cron job and include an email notification by tweaking this script, or you can check it periodically by a tool such as PRTG.

PHP URL include vulnerability detection and workaround

Some exploits never get old.  One such example is an exploit that takes advantage of PHP URL include vulnerability.   It’s particularly nasty because it lets the attackers execute arbitrary PHP code without leaving any trace on the server it self.  The whole exploit executes in memory and vanishes once the attacker got what they were after.    With no back doors left behind, there are only two ways to find out.  You can either spot the suspicious entry in your log files, or you can run a script that checks whether your server is vulnerable to the attack in the first place.

#!/bin/bash

if [ -z "$1" ]; then

        echo "Error, must specify domain name"

        exit 0

fi

#do not change example.org this is one of the rare cases, when it serves an actual function.

wget -q -O test http://$1/?-d%20allow_url_include%3DOn+-d%20auto_prepend_file%3Dhttp://example.org

grep "This domain is established to be used for illustrative examples" test > /dev/null

if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then

        echo

        echo "$1 is VULNERABLE add the following to .htaccess file and retry"

        echo

        echo "RewriteEngine on"

        echo "RewriteCond %{QUERY_STRING} ^[^=]*$"

        echo "RewriteCond %{QUERY_STRING} %2d|- [NC]"

        echo "RewriteRule .? – [F,L]"

        echo

else

        echo

        echo "$1 is OK"

fi

When you run this tool, you will see this if the web site you are scanning is vulnerable:

# ./test-url-include.sh vulnerablesite.com

vulnerablesite.com is VULNERABLE add the following to .htaccess file and retry

RewriteEngine on
RewriteCond %{QUERY_STRING} ^[^=]*$
RewriteCond %{QUERY_STRING} %2d|- [NC]
RewriteRule .? – [F,L]

I should add that the proper way is to patch PHP to a version that doesn’t have the vulnerability. The .htaccess fix works, but as you can imagine, it’s a bandaid solution. If you have this vulnerability, chances are you also have many more like it.

Rubber Stamp from a Big Name or Real Security?

This week I challenged a client (and myself) to a test.  The client went out to get a vulnerability assessment of their SaaS web application from a North American firm who is recognized as one of the top IT security companies in the field.  Let’s call them “H”.  I was sympathetic when my client explained that the reason they picked H.  It was precisely because H was widely recognized and it would be easier to “sell” the result of the assessment to their downstream customers.  In other word H would provide a superior rubber stamp.

This bothered me a bit.  So I offered the client the following challenge: If I do a second vulnerability assessment on the same web application will I find more vulnerabilities than H can?

Long story short.  I found more vulnerabilities.

H found

–              1 High risk vulnerability

–              3 Medium risk vulnerabilities

–              1 Low risk vulnerability

–              5 Total

I found:

–              4  High risk vulnerabilities

–              5  Medium risk vulnerabilities

–              8  Low risk vulnerabilities

–              17 Total

Quantity isn’t everything of course.  I also supplied proof of concept code for key vulnerabilities that were not easily reproducible through the application’s GUI.  My client shared with me that H charged more than $15,000 for their work.  In this case, my work was pro-bono, but If I were to charge the client next time, it would have cost them approximately $3000 including preparation and follow-up.  If I crunch the numbers (vulnerabilities per $) I figure that in this case I was about 20x more efficient than H.

I have considered whether luck played any role in this difference.  When it comes to finding vulnerabilities I can’t deny that luck does play a role.  But luck without skill will yield absolutely nothing useful.  With a 20x difference in value, and the fact that H must have surely used a top notch analyst, with top notch tools, it still doesn’t add up well for H.

While I believe I successfully answered the question whether it’s better to use an IT security freelancer such as myself versus a “Big Name” in security, there is a big question that remains:

Do you want a shiny rubber stamp? Or do you need real security?

Let’s encrypt is awesome

It used to be that if you wanted to encrypt using SSL you have couple of choices.  You can either self sign for $0 and get a narly warning message every time you or your users visit the site.  Or you could pay $60+/year for SSL certificate.

Let’s encrypt gives you a 3 month (indefinitely renewable) certificate for free.  The best part isn’t the cost though.  The best part is that the setup is so easy.  You can get SSL certificate for your apache site right from command line with 3 button presses.  You can’t do that even if you pay $200 for commercial SSL.  It will take you at least 30 minutes to do it.

There must be a catch right?  Not really, although right now my Blackberry doesn’t recognize the cert.  That will change with time though.  It’s only because let’s encrypt is too new.

Adventures with TeslaCrypt (AKA “VVV Virus”)

I received an urgent call from a client.  The client’s computer got hit by the VVV virus AKA TeslaCrypt. All of their files were renamed to .vvv and when trying to open them, a message said that the only way to get them back was to pay $500 USD before a specific date, or $1000 USD after.  The payment had to be in bitcoins.  First question I asked: “Do you have a backup?” Client said “No”.  Having read up about ransomware like CryptoLocker, I knew this was  bad news.  Normally once the files are encrypted, it’s game over.   Only way out is backup.  Nevertheless, I dove into researching a possible solution – just in case.

There were 4 possible methods that I tried:

  • Restore from windows shadow copy. This didn’t work in this version of TeslaCrypt.  The criminals learned to wipe the shadow copies before encrypting the files.
  • Undelete files (someone claimed that when the files are encrypted a copy is made and original deleted). This didn’t work, I could not find a single deleted file that matched it’s encrypted counterpart.  All I found were files that were legitimately deleted by the user long before the infection.  This kind of makes sense, because surely the encryption process will overwrite the data rather than creating a copy.  But anything is worth a try when you are desperate.
  • Decrypt using key.dat (where the decryption key is stored). This didn’t work either because this was newer version of TeslaCrypt.  In the old version the criminals were stupid enough to leave the decryption key right on the infected system.   In the new version, they hold the key on a server they control.
  • Decrypt using a tool called teslacrack.py. This eventually ended up working – but more on that later.

Running out of time, and faced with the slim chance of recovery, my client felt he had no choice other than to pay the ransom.   The criminals are running  an organized business, and this gives it the impression that they may actually deliver the decryption key after payment in order to preserve their reputation.   After all, if people have bad experience after sending a payment, the word will spread and no one will ever send them any money no matter how desperate they are.  On the other hand if the payment and decryption are very quick and easy, people will see it as an easy way out. This, combined with how easy it is for the criminal to give out the decryption key (just a single click of a button) it is in the criminal’s best interest to deliver the decryption key promptly.  All signs pointed to a well organized setup.  The criminals even have even had  a working web support and billing system where you can get answers to your questions regarding on how to submit your Bitcoin payment.  The response time to a general question ended up being about 4 hours – which is not bad.   Actually better than support at many large enterprises.  Still, there are so many things that could go wrong.  Maybe the criminals are just plain evil and see this as a onetime money grab.  Maybe they could not care less about their reputation.  Maybe the criminals get shut down just before having the chance to send you the key.  Maybe the criminals screw up and lose the key, so even though they might have wanted to give it to you, they simply don’t have it.  Maybe the criminals are stupid and don’t use business sense for deciding how to behave.  You are doomed if you send payment, and you are doomed if you don’t.  I was glad that it wasn’t me in this situation.  I would have no idea what to do next.

My client on the other hand had to make that decision – and quickly.  He decided to pay.  Trouble was that the only accepted method of payment was through bit Bitcoin (BTC).  Because he did not have $500 USD in BTC, he had to buy Bitcoins first.  Even though it’s becoming easier and easier to buy Bitcoin, it’s still quite a process.  You either have to go through 2-5 day verification process or you have to fully trust the Bitcoin vendor.   Neither of those options was good because we were running out of time  and we were not in the mood to blindly “trust people”.  In the end we were lucky because now there is a Bitcoin ATM at Café Blanca in downtown Calgary.  There you can buy and sell Bitcoins with cash instantly.  You insert cash and the bitcoins appear in your Bitcoin wallet 2 seconds later. My client ended up gradually putting in about $700 CAD in cash to purchase 1.1 Bitcoins which the criminals demanded in order to cover the $500 USD fee.  With 1.1 bitcoins ready, we went back to the criminal’s web payment portal.  Just as we were reading the payment instructions for the 3rd time to be extra sure there is no mistake, we noticed that the criminals raised the cost to 1.25 bitcoins.  We had to top up the bitcoin wallet and proceeded to make the payment.  We sent the payment and included the transaction ID which proved receipt by the criminals.  Then we waited.  10 minutes, nothing.   1 Hour – nothing.  5 Hours – nothing.  1 day – nothing.  That was it.  The criminals got the money and we’ll never the key.  The files were still encrypted and useless.

During all the waiting, I resumed trying my hand at decryption.  To my amazement teslacrack.py method actually worked.  Not only it worked, but once I figured out the right tools and the right steps,  the actual computation time to crack the key was only 30 seconds.  This was amazing because normally these methods take weeks if you are extremely lucky.   It turns out that in addition to a mountain worth of luck on my side, the criminals made a mistake in the way they encrypted the files.  If the criminals didn’t make that mistake, no amount of luck would have helped.   Cracking  the key would take millions of years.  It is also interesting to note that the criminals encrypted different sets of files using 2 different keys meaning that even if they let  you decrypt one set of files, the other set of files would still be encrypted (presumably to force you to pay an additional fee).   Furthermore the key for one set of files was cracked in 30 seconds, the second key took more than 5 days with no success.  Luckily, the first set contained the critical files, and the client was not too concerned about the second set, so we stopped there.  By the way, eventually the link that took us to the criminal’s billing/support site went blank.  We’re never going to see that key or the $700+ CAD.

 Lessons reinforced:

  • Backup, backup, backup, backup.  There is not going to be a second chance like this again.  A mistake like this is not going to show up again in their next version of ransomware.  In fact there are other variants of ransomware that are already impossible to crack.  Did I mention backup?
  • When dealing with criminals never expect a favorable outcome. If you’re sending any money for ransom, consider it lost the moment you hit send.  What’s more, be prepared for escalation.  Once the criminals know you are willing to send money they may come back at you with asking for more.  They will either just ask for more even though you already send exactly what they asked for, or you may find out that after part of your files are decrypted, the other part is still encrypted.

How to recover:

Step 1) Take backup and work from the backup

  • This is important because even though your files are encrypted and apparently useless, your day will get considerably worse if you lose them somehow. What if the ransomware detects you are trying to decrypt and deletes everything right now and then?

Step 2) Install programs:

  • Python 2.7 (32 bit because it must match library below)
  • Pycrypto-2.6.win32-py2.7 library (I ended up using this because I had trouble compiling the library from source)
  • Msieve150_win32 (I also tried optimized versions for Intel processors and CUDA, but reading about possible bugs didn’t give me confidence, so try them, and if they work then fine, but don’t forget to have version 150 as your fail safe)

Step 3) Identify the AES key that you will try to crack

  • Place some vvv files in the same folder as teslacrack.py and run teslacrack.py
  • You will get something like this:

 

Cannot decrypt ./IMG_1111.JPG.vvv, unknown key

Software has encountered the following unknown AES keys, please crack them first using msieve: 

346FA15D6F7106A05553587E67AD068EBF0CE65C9ECBA74BAE144661AB502CEFFEBCFA9FBB3CDFD9E4043B3402F970051E55063D96C94AB66B443A0F9D088A23 found in ./IMG_1111.JPG.vvv 

Alternatively, you can crack the following Bitcoin key(s) using msieve, and use them with TeslaDecoder: 

E82E090D9A73DC4E93201BC56394544493EFD0DD2631F588C4083F006C1CD419F096F1D6E646AA0DE8D0230CB18D009B231DEA6EF7CAFED03C6C53830E51074A found in ./IMG_1111.JPG.vvv

 

Step 4) Crack the AES key

Run msieve with the AES key found in step 3 (notice 0x in front):

msieve -v -e 0x346FA15D6F7106A05553587E67AD068EBF0CE65C9ECBA74BAE144661AB502CEFFEBCFA9FBB3CDFD9E4043B3402F970051E55063D96C94AB66B443A0F9D088A23

You should see something like this

random seeds: 4e305a00 6fb1837c

factoring 2746299090781689070444389534863512001481868057180589068197106350690661

98749363149686207988485815608295042086154388677331498764717631003373547132362899

7155 (154 digits)

searching for 15-digit factors

P-1 stage 1 factor found

searching for 20-digit factors

P-1 stage 2 factor found

searching for 25-digit factors

P-1 stage 2 factor found

commencing quadratic sieve (33-digit input)

using multiplier of 3

using VC8 32kb sieve core

sieve interval: 4 blocks of size 32768

processing polynomials in batches of 51

using a sieve bound of 4909 (341 primes)

using large prime bound of 196360 (17 bits)

polynomial 'A' values have 4 factors



sieving in progress (press Ctrl-C to pause)

696 relations (302 full + 394 combined from 2196 partial), need 437

696 relations (302 full + 394 combined from 2196 partial), need 437

sieving complete, commencing postprocessing

begin with 2498 relations

reduce to 1007 relations in 2 passes

attempting to read 1007 relations

recovered 1007 relations

recovered 24 polynomials

attempting to build 696 cycles

found 696 cycles in 1 passes

distribution of cycle lengths:

   length 1 : 302

   length 2 : 394

largest cycle: 2 relations

matrix is 341 x 696 (0.1 MB) with weight 11065 (15.90/col)

sparse part has weight 11065 (15.90/col)

filtering completed in 1 passes

matrix is 341 x 405 (0.0 MB) with weight 5168 (12.76/col)

sparse part has weight 5168 (12.76/col)

commencing Lanczos iteration

memory use: 0.0 MB

lanczos halted after 7 iterations (dim = 330)

recovered 63 nontrivial dependencies

commencing quadratic sieve (69-digit input)

using multiplier of 23

using VC8 32kb sieve core

sieve interval: 12 blocks of size 32768

processing polynomials in batches of 17

using a sieve bound of 209771 (9278 primes)

using large prime bound of 19508703 (24 bits)

using trial factoring cutoff of 24 bits

polynomial 'A' values have 9 factors



sieving in progress (press Ctrl-C to pause)

9427 relations (4473 full + 4954 combined from 52519 partial), need 9374

9427 relations (4473 full + 4954 combined from 52519 partial), need 9374

sieving complete, commencing postprocessing

begin with 56992 relations

reduce to 13757 relations in 2 passes

attempting to read 13757 relations

recovered 13757 relations

recovered 11859 polynomials

attempting to build 9427 cycles

found 9427 cycles in 1 passes

distribution of cycle lengths:

   length 1 : 4473

   length 2 : 4954

largest cycle: 2 relations

matrix is 9278 x 9427 (1.3 MB) with weight 274633 (29.13/col)

sparse part has weight 274633 (29.13/col)

filtering completed in 3 passes

matrix is 8448 x 8512 (1.2 MB) with weight 244661 (28.74/col)

sparse part has weight 244661 (28.74/col)

commencing Lanczos iteration

memory use: 1.2 MB

lanczos halted after 135 iterations (dim = 8443)

recovered 61 nontrivial dependencies

p1 factor: 3

p1 factor: 5

p6 factor: 418819

p8 factor: 10304417

prp13 factor: 8162073202471

prp14 factor: 84794311049579

prp19 factor: 3135407003350317697

prp25 factor: 2560807722929541167424011

prp26 factor: 19683723106610479028057093

prp45 factor: 387847886921773814156469727175786645600806381

elapsed time 00:00:37 

 

Depending how lucky you are, this process will run for anywhere from minutes to weeks.

Step 5)  Unfactor based on prime factors from step 4

 

  • take the 10 factors at the very end of the file and feed them into unfactor-ecdsa.py.   If any factors are listed multiple times, repeat them also.
unfactor-ecdsa.py ./IMG_1111.JPG.vvv 3 5 418819 10304417 8162073202471 84794311049579 3135407003350317697 2560807722929541167424011 19683723106610479028057093 387847886921773814156469727175786645600806381

Found AES private key: b'\x6d\xb8\x64\x76\x72\x31\xc4\xff\xfc\x22\x48\x20\xa5\xbc\xcd\x6c\x4c\x30\x2f\xc3\x4d\xd6\xfa\x23\x4b\x4b\x9e\x0c\x1d\xaf\xec\x07' (6DB864767231C4FFFC224820A5BCCD6C4C302FC34DD6FA234B4B9E0C1DAFEC07)

 

Step 6) Use AES private key to decrypt all your files

  • Edit teslacrack.py and add AES private key to the list of keys at the beginning of the file
  • Run teslacrack.py C:\
  • It will decrypt every vvv file that was encrypted by this specific key

 

Step 7) Backup, backup, backup.  Next time this will NOT work.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Convert dynamic site to a static HTML site

Sometimes it’s useful to convert dynamic PHP, ASP.NET, Java, or CGI pages to static HTML sites.  This comes in handy when trying to create a copy for disaster recovery.  It is also good way to stop hackers from hacking your PHP site that’s obsolete, unpatched or otherwise insecure.   I find wget is the quickest way to get the job done:

wget -l10 –mirror -p -e robots=off –convert-links –html-extension http://thesiteyouaremirroring.com

Account Registration phone verification internals

Phone verification is becoming wide spread for free account sign ups on sites like Yahoo, Gmail, Craig’s list, Facebook etc.   I hate giving out my real info just to test something with a burner account.   In the past, the solution was as simple as Googling “receive free sms” and going to one of dozen’s sites that will receive the verification code.   I knew that it was too easy to last.  Sure enough, the numbers from those sites are now black listed.

I really didn’t want to give out my primary cell phone to Yahoo.  So I reached went for the next best thing.  My VoIP trunk provider has the capability to receive SMS on a VoIP number and forward it to my primary phone, or even as an email.   I entered that in, and to my surprise yahoo still rejected it.   That got me thinking.  How can they be blacklisting my own private number?  No one else registered with it before.

How it works:

With the numbers being ported all over the place, how can they know whether a particular number is a VoIP number?  The short answer is that they don’t know.   They take a guess based on the information that’s publicly available (or available for small fee) through sources such as these:

Local calling guide is actually quite accurate (and free).  Where it messes up, is as soon as a number is ported.   It will only show the name of the telco that originally registered the number, all subsequent ports are ignored.   When I looked up my numbers that failed to verify, sure enough they all came back as belonging to a VoIP company.  Same thing when I tried to look up many “receive free sms” service numbers.   They all showed up as VoIP.

So now what?  I still don’t want to give Yahoo my cell phone

… There isn’t a fool proof way, but some of these may work

  • Port a “real” number to VoIP.  It costs me about $12/first year to have a secondary VoIP number – which of course doesn’t work that great now days.  Porting a real number to VoIP will work, but it’s little bit more time and money.   I figure about $50/first year (get a sim, port it, cancel original service, keep it running as VoIP).   Not that bad, but a little too much trouble for what I’m using it for.
  • Sign up with a service that provides verification codes for burner phone numbers.   They do the above steps for you in mass scale as a service.   I haven’t tried it though.  If they listed their numbers in advance I could look them up to see if they show up as VoIP.  For this to work they must have a proper setup using “real” phone numbers.   Also it’s hard to believe that they wouldn’t get black listed in a hurry.   Maybe there is one that works, but chances are if it works, now it won’t work several months later.
  • Give up for now (until something better comes along)… this is kind of what I ended up doing.  I still didn’t give them a real number; I ended up reviving one of my old yahoo accounts.  I used it instead.

 

IT Security Secret Weapon: Physical Control

Strong IT security is a losing proposition.   If you want to develop a system that’s connected to the internet that is unhackable, you’ve lost the game already.   There is no such thing.  If someone wants to hack you they will succeed.   The only thing you can do is inch your way up the ladder and eliminate the lowest hanging fruit.   The strategy becomes being faster than your friend rather than trying to outrun the bear.   Other than that get ready to be hacked.   Your goal should be to get hacked less frequently than your competitors, and when you’re hacked you want to be sure it’s an inconvenience rather than a business ending catastrophy.

Preventing the severity of the attack is where the tables turn.   You as an owner of your data, have an upper hand in restoring control. Just as you had no foolproof protection against getting hacked, your adversary faces the same problem if their goal is to wipe  your data or your business operation off the face of the earth.   They will not succeed if you don’t want them to.  Your secret weapon is physical control.  As long are you retain physical control over your data, you may lose many battles, but you will ultimately win the war.

When hackers penetrate a single system, they call that “owning the system”.   However, that is overstating their accomplishment a bit.   They should really claim that they “temporary control” the system.   Of course, that doesn’t have the same ring to it.   They don’t “own” anything if they can be locked out by you the owner.    Yes, they can do all kinds of damage while on the system.   Yes, they can cause down time.   Yes, it can be a huge disaster.   Yes, it sucks to be hacked.  But as long as you retain physical control over your system you’ll always have the upper hand in the long run.

Why physical control?   What makes physical control so special?  It’s because no matter what kind of games and silly wars happen at the OS or application level, you have a secret secret weapon that hackers don’t.   It’s a weapon that’s unstoppable.   It’s a weapon that makes all the games stop.   You have physical control.   Only you can unplug a network cable – they can never plug it back in.   Only you can shutdown a machine – they can never start it.  Only you can do a offline bare-metal restore and they can’t do a thing about it.   Only you can put your your offsite backups in your briefcase, they can hack all night and they are not going to touch those.

This is why public cloud computing is problematic.   Public cloud takes away the only truly effective weapon you had.   You have 0 physical control in public cloud.   You can’t unplug cables, you can’t carry away your backups in a briefcase,  and you can’t restore elsewhere.   You’re not the owner anymore.  With public cloud, you’ve outsourced the battle.  The battle is now between your cloud provider and the hacker.   Will the cloud fight as hard for you as you would fight for yourself?   Probably not.  In fact I guarantee it.   The cloud will point their finger at you and call it a day.

If you’re going to use the cloud, your physical infrastructure needs to be the root that controls it all.    Don’t think of a cloud as a way to “keep your stuff safe”, think of it as a pace where you temporarily place your stuff to get a specific job done.   It could be there one day, gone the next – just like a cloud.   You should always remain the physical owner of your data and of your key infrastructure.